Release trains
Security hotfix
Ship the bootstrap and Pub/Sub authentication fixes first. Release gates:- unauthenticated bootstrap and alert-ingestion requests are rejected;
- Google OIDC signature, issuer, audience, expiry, and service-account mapping tests pass;
- only one bootstrap activation can win under concurrent requests;
- security audit evidence has been reviewed and unauthorized accounts, sessions, and credentials have been revoked or rotated;
- deployment configuration contains an explicit Pub/Sub audience and identity mapping.
Correctness release
Ship session-policy enforcement, time-entry authorization, case-list menu behavior, and checklist reconciliation next. Pilot one organization before wider rollout. Preview checklist reconciliation before applying it and retain policy snapshots and completed-item history. Rollback:- Pause new reconciliation jobs.
- Allow in-flight jobs to finish or reach an idempotent checkpoint.
- Disable automatic reconciliation while retaining the manual preview path.
- Roll back application code. Do not delete checklist history or downgrade a database schema until the down-migration has been reviewed on a production snapshot.
Capability release
Enable team summaries, workflow tag actions, alert unlinking, and Defender enrichment independently. Start with one organization and one workflow or Defender connection. Alert unlink uses detach-only semantics. Copied case evidence, observables, techniques, time records, and promotion provenance remain on the case.Authorization acceptance matrix
Validate each changed API and UI path with:- unauthenticated user;
- suspended or expired user;
- SOC analyst tiers 1, 2, and 3;
- SOC lead and manager;
- organization administrator;
- platform super administrator;
- user with an active case access grant;
- user with an expired or revoked case access grant;
- case-scoped external collaborator;
- organization-scoped API key and service principal.
Required monitoring
Create alerts and dashboards for:- rejected bootstrap and Pub/Sub authentication requests;
- OIDC failures grouped by issuer, audience, and mapped identity without recording tokens;
- session idle and absolute expirations, forced revocations, and concurrent session denials;
- time-entry authorization failures by permission and role;
- checklist preview, reconciliation lag, retired-item count, retries, and terminal failures;
- workflow tag retries and dead-lettered executions;
- alert unlink attempts, denials, and successes;
- Defender throttling, consent failures, partial enrichment, malware rejection, and artifact deduplication;
- external collaborator grant creation, expiry, revocation, and access denials;
- custom-role changes, assignment impact, and authorization shadow mismatches.
Pilot exit criteria
A pilot can expand only when:- no cross-tenant or cross-case access is observed;
- error and denial rates are understood and within the agreed service objective;
- reconciliation has no unexplained active-item drift;
- workflow and Defender retries are idempotent;
- all privileged operations have complete chained audit records;
- backup restore and application rollback have been rehearsed;
- product, security, operations, and customer support owners sign off.